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I
INTRODUCTION
The United States did not approve the recently completed Law of the Sea
Convention, nor will we sign it, because of our objections to the Treaty's provisions
on deep seabed mining. Our rejection of the final Convention was an unfortunate
end to our decade-long effort to produce a comprehensive oceans agreement.
II
THE UNITED STATES DECISION NOT TO SIGN THE CONVENTION
The United States has always recognized the critical importance of the world's
oceans to mankind as a potentially enormous source of food, fuel, and minerals
and as a vehicle for communication, navigation, and scientific learning. The
United States has been a leader in the development of international oceans law.
For the past decade, the United States worked diligently with other nations to
develop a Law of the Sea Treaty. Throughout these negotiations, it has been our
national policy to defend the freedom of navigation and communication, promote
the rights of resource exploration and development, and advance obligations to
protect the marine environment.
Shortly after assuming office, President Reagan suspended United States par-
ticipation in the Tenth Session of the Third U.N. Conference on Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III) and ordered a high-level interagency review of our national oceans
policy. This exhaustive, year-long review concluded that the draft Convention's
nonseabed provisions regarding navigation, overflight, the continental shelf,
marine research, and the environment generally reflected customary international
law and were acceptable to the United States. The deep seabed mining provisions
of the Draft Convention text were, however, unacceptable and clearly contrary to
vital U.S. interests. In addition, the Convention would create other undesirable
precedents, such as the mandatory transfer of technology and distribution of funds
to national liberation movements.
On January 29, 1982, after reviewing the interagency report, the President
announced that the United States would return to the negotiations and would
continue to negotiate with other nations to reach agreement on an acceptable Law
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of the Sea Convention. The President emphasized our strong commitment to mul-
tilateral negotiations, but he also made it clear that final U.S. acceptance of the
LOS Convention was premised on the satisfaction of six key objectives in the Con-
vention's deep seabed provisions. To this end, the President instructed the U.S.
delegation to negotiate a treaty that:
would not deter development of any deep seabed mineral resources to meet national and
world demand;
would assure national access to these resources by current and future qualified entities to
enhance U.S. security of supply, to avoid monopolization of the resources by the operating
arm of the International Seabed Authority, and to promote the economic development of
the resources;
would provide a decision-making role in the deep seabed regime that fairly reflected and
effectively protected the political and economic interests and financial contributions of par-
ticipating states;
would not allow for amendments to come into force without approval of the participating
states, including in our case the advice and consent of the Senate:
would not set other undesirable precedents for international organizations: and
would be likely to receive the advice and consent of the Senate. In this regard, the Conven-
tion should not contain provisions for the mandatory transfer of private technology and
participation by, and funding for, national liberation movements.'
Throughout the negotiations, a principal goal of the United States was the
development of an international regime that would permit commercial explora-
tion and development of deep seabed minerals under reasonable terms and condi-
tions. The six objectives announced by the President satisfied U.S. interests and
would have benefited all nations by creating a sound legal foundation for the
development of seabed minerals.
The U.S. delegation returned to UNCLOS III in New York fully prepared to
work and negotiate with other nations in order to develop mutually acceptable
solutions to the difficult problems facing the Conference. Unfortunately, there was
very little actual negotiation, and after two months of intensive efforts by the U.S.
negotiating team, it became clear that the President's objectives would not be ful-
filled. Not surprisingly, the Conference ultimately adopted the Law of the Sea
Convention over U.S. objections in April of 1982.
As a consequence, on July 9, 1982, the President declared that the United
States would not sign the LOS Convention and that further U.S. participation in
the remaining conference process would be at the technical level limited to those
provisions that serve U.S. interests. In his statement, President Reagan explained
that the following problems remained with the Convention adopted by the
Conference:
Provisions that would actually deter future development of deep seabed mineral resources,
when such development should serve the interest of all countries:
A decision-making process that would not give the United States or others a role that fairly
reflects and protects their interests;
Provisions that would allow amendments to enter into force for the United States without
its approval; this is clearly incompatible with the U.S. approach to such treaties:
Stipulations relating to mandatory transfer of private technology and the possibility of
national liberation movements sharing in benefits, and
1. Statement by the President, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. D3c:. 94 (Jan. 29, 1982).
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The absence of assured access for future Cqualified deep seabed miners to promote the clevel-
op mtent of these resources.
2
It should be noted that U.S. companies support the President's decision not to
sign the Convention. They agree with the President's conclusion that the Treaty
would jeopardize private access to seabed resources and establish adverse prece-
dents in necessary conflict with the interests of industrialized nations.
A. Why the Convention Cannot be Changed by the Preparatory Commission
The deep seabed provisions of the Convention establish an international
bureaucracy called the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom). The Preparatory
Commission will be responsible for developing the rules and regulations which will
govern deep seabed mining. The Preparatory Commission convened in March
1983 to begin the process of implementing the Treaty's deep seabed mining provi-
sions. Many critics of the Administration's decision not to sign the Convention
have suggested that our decision not to sign the Convention was premature and
that the Preparatory Commission can alleviate the vast majority of our objections
and concerns. This is not true.
During the Conference, the United States consistently objected to those specific
articles of the Convention which were contrary to our national interests. Despite
prolonged efforts at negotiations, however, the United States was unable to
achieve any substantive changes in the Covention text during the Conference due
in large part to the inflexibility of the Conference management. The Preparatory
Commission is bound to the language of the Convention and cannot change the
Convention text. Therefore, it cannot formulate rules and regulations which will
in any way overcome the U.S. objections to the deep seabed portions of the
Convention.
Moreover, U.S. participation in the Preparatory Commission could not
'clarify" ambiguities in the Treaty nor serve any meaningful purpose. In fact,
U.S. participation in the PrepCom might inferentially suggest to other nations
that U.S. objections to the Treaty are merely rhetoric and that the United States
intends to sign the Convention eventually. The United States will not sign the
Convention and any inference, impression, or perception to the contrary would
hinder our efficacy in developing alternative deep seabed regimes, thereby possibly
destroying the legitimate expectations of U.S. companies and our allies.
B. The New International Economic Order
Proponents of the LOS Convention frequently espouse the concept of the New
International Economic Order (NIEO) which in essence advocates redistribution
of the world's economic wealth through organizations such as the International
Seabed Authority. Indeed, high-level LOS officials are already proclaiming that
the principle of the NIEO, as incorporated in the LOS Treaty, can be applied in
other areas such as the Antarctic and outer space. The United States is deeply
concerned about the grave dangers of legitimizing this socialist concept by signing
the LOS Treaty.
2. Statement by the Presidet., 18 W - t, COmP. PR-S. D(x: 887, 887-88 (July 9. 1982).
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Furthermore, the LOS Convention is predicated on the concept that the deep
seabed is the "common heritage" of mankind. The "common heritage" is cer-
tainly a noble phrase. Unfortunately, the phrase became severely distorted in its
meaning during the long LOS negotiations. It became a guise under which the
seabed's wealth was to be governed, regulated, and allocated under the false
assumption that every nation has an undivided property interest in the deep
seabed, and therefore, each is automatically entitled to its proportionate share of
the fruits from those whose efforts produce wealth from what would otherwise be
economically valueless. The International Seabed Authority would have been
given the unprecedented power to redistribute wealth on an international scale.
The United States cannot and will not agree to turn over the management of
the resources of the oceans and other largely unexplored frontiers to large, ineffi-
cient international bureaucracies. The United States believes that there is an
urgent need for international cooperation in defining the rights and obligations of
all who wish to participate in the development of such resources. Indeed, it was
this very belief in international cooperation which provided the motivation for our
participation throughout the UNCLOS III Treaty process. Cooperation, however,
implies mutual obligations, and it became disappointingly apparent during negoti-
ations that under the NIEO the developing nations may assert many rights, but
they are burdened with very few reciprocal obligations.
The United States has a right to insist upon international mechanisms and
policies that are consistent with our free market and democratic principles. It is
because of these principles that America obtained her present wealth and high
standard of living-it is these same principles which will promote international
economic growth and freedom.
C. Future Course: Deep Seabed Mining
The LOS Convention discriminates against private investment in deep seabed
mining. There will be no investment in seabed mining under the LOS Convention
unless governments are willing heavily to subsidize their companies or mining enti-
ties. Promoting U.S. flag deep seabed mining under appropriate domestic legisla-
tion will be a primary objective of our national oceans policy. The United States
and eight other nations seriously interested in commercial seabed mining have
completed negotiations on an international agreement creating a deep seabed
regime that will encourage investment in marine mining, technological develop-
ment, exploration, and the production and pricing of mineral resources guided by
market forces. This regime will be a minimalist one, which will provide access to
and encourage the production of seabed minerals without costly and unnecessary
political, legal, and economic restraints.
The American Mining Congress has stated that "a satisfactory investment cli-
mate can be created and the basic conditions met by building on the existing
Public Law 96-283, , ,3 the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act. 4 The
United States is currently processing applications for ten of the twelve mine sites
3. Law of the Sea: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of /he House Comm. on ,ferchant Alarmhe and
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for which licenses are being sought by existing mining consortia. Despite a few
duplicate and conflicting applications filed with other countries, we are in a most
favorable position. Conflict resolution procedures have been agreed to by five of
the six consortia. Therefore, it is difficult to credit allegations that seabed mining
activities will only take place under foreign flags and within the compass of the
LOS Treaty.
On September 2, 1982, the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and
France signed an interim agreement which encourages deep seabed mining pio-
neers to resolve overlaps among license applications and require consultation
among the signatories before the issuance of licenses or establishment of reciprocal
recognition of mine sites. This agreement demonstrates that the United States can
and will continue to cooperate with other nations in the protection and advance-
ment of important oceanic interests.
III
FUTURE COURSE: NONSEABED
The interagency group found that the nonseabed provisions of the LOS Con-
vention were generally consistent with the interests of the United States and were
based on customary international law. Therefore, the assertion of our nonseabed
interests will not require that we become party to the LOS Convention.
Unimpeded commercial naval and air mobility are essential to our national
interests. Some claim that by rejecting the LOS Convention the United States will
lose the navigation rights set out in the Convention, rights the United States
sought to secure in a comprehensive LOS Convention. According to the argument,
if the United States does not accept the seabed mining provisions, the rights set
forth in other portions of the Convention are forfeited. This is simply not so. Par-
ticularly with respect to navigation rights, the history of the law of the sea has been
predominantly a history of customary rules evolving through state practice. In
this area the Convention incorporates existing law, which will continue to apply to
all states, not because of the Treaty, but because of the customary law underlying
the Treaty. This is a fundamental, immutable, and time-honored principle of
international law. My government is confident that the United States and our
allies have the legal basis to protect our navigational interests outside the
Convention.
In addition, those portions of the LOS Convention that are predicated on the
creation of new international organizations are clearly contractual in nature and
will, therefore, pertain to Treaty parties only. This is the case with the unique and
unprecedented provisions on deep seabed exploitation and dispute settlement.
In summary, nonparties to the LOS Convention will continue to have the navi-
gational rights and freedoms recognized in customary international law, including
the navigational rights and freedoms recognized in the Convention, whether in the
Fhewres, 97th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. 330 (1981-82) (statement of Conrad G. Welling on behalf of the
American Mining Congress).
4. 30 U.S.C. § 1401 (Supp. IV 1980).
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territorial sea, the Exclusive Economic Zone, international straits, or archipelagic
waters. This is because the Convention cannot deprive nonparties of their existing
rights, either commercial or military. The United States, in particular, will not
alter the operations of its maritime forces as a result of its decision not to sign the
LOS Treaty.
A. The Exclusive Economic Zone
Acting upon the recommendation of the interagency Group for Ocean Law
and Policy, President Reagan proclaimed the establishment of a 200-mile Exclu-
sive Economic Zone (EEZ) for the United States. The concept of the EEZ is
included in the LOS Convention and is generally regarded as having a basis in
customary international law. 5 Typically, the EEZ is recognized as an area beyond
and adjacent to the territorial sea within which the coastal state exerts sovereign
rights for exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing the national resources
of the seabed, subsoil, and superadjacent waters.
The continental shelf is a major source of petroleum and minerals. Under the
1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 6 and customary international
law, a coastal state has sovereign rights over the exploration and exploitation of
the living and nonliving resources of its continental shelf. From the underlying
theory of the 1958 Convention, a state could consider the resources of its entire
adjacent continental margin as an extension of its natural land mass and therefore
subject to its jurisdiction and control. The LOS Convention defines for parties the
outer edge of the continental margin.
Moreover, the LOS Convention also requires coastal states to make payments
to the International Seabed Authority based on a percentage of revenues derived
from the exploitation of the resources found within the continental margin beyond
200 miles from the coast. No such obligation exists in customary international law.
Prior to the establishment of the EEZ, the United States already had fishery
resource jurisdiction extending 200 nautical miles from the coast, sovereign rights
over the resources of the continental shelf, and certain authority beyond the terri-
torial seas relating to pollution control. The establishment of the EEZ does not
materially affect our fishery jurisdiction or our continental shelf resource jurisdic-
tion, but it does establish new U.S. jurisdiction over the mineral resources of the
ocean floor beyond the continental shelf out to 200 nautical miles. In addition, the
EEZ brings within U.S. jurisdiction other economic activities, such as energy pro-
duction from wind, wave, and tide, as well as marine pollution, marine scientific
research including all installations, artificial islands, and structures used for eco-
nomic purposes.
The establishment of the EEZ demonstrates our intent to protect and promote
U.S. interests in developing and conserving those resources to which the United
States is entitled under international law. It clearly establishes our rights to the
.5. S'oe Continental Shelf (I unisia v. Libyan Arab Jarnahiriva). 1982 I.C.J. 4, 74 (Judgument of Feb.
24).
6. 15 U.S.T. 471. T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
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seabed minerals within 200 nautical miles of our coasts. Some of these mineral
resources, such as the cobalt-rich crusts on seamounts, have only recently been
discovered; but it is likely others will be discovered as exploration of the seabed
continues. Furthermore, preservation of the high seas status of the water column of
the EEZ provides a valuable precedent that will help limit further encroachment
on traditional high seas freedoms in the EEZ's of other countries.
Many nations had feared that the United States, by removing itself from the
UNCLOS III process, would reject all jurisdictional claims reflected in the
UNCLOS III Convention. This fear was unfounded. By establishing an EEZ, the
United States has reassured the international community and restored our leader-
ship in the development of international oceans law. The United States' establish-
ment of an EEZ is a positive demonstration of our continued opposition to certain
unacceptable provisions of the UNCLOS III Convention, but at the same time it
demonstrates our willingness to conform to those portions of the LOS Convention
which reflect customary international law. By shaping the content of our EEZ to
permit maximum freedom of the high seas consonant with U.S. resource jurisdic-
tion, we may influence the implementation of the EEZ concept by other states and
thus retard further erosion of the freedom of the seas in the 200-mile zones.
B. Fisheries
Fisheries constitute the world's largest source of protein. The United States
will continue to emphasize its national interest in ensuring proper management
and conservation of the world's fish stocks and in revitalizing our nation's coastal
and distant water fishing industries through economic incentives, reduction of reg-
ulatory burdens, and cooperative bilateral and regional arrangements.
The U.S. coastal fisherman's interests are generally protected by the Magnuson
Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 7 and the United States exercises
exclusive control and management over all fishery resources, except tuna, within
200 nautical miles of our coast. Approximately ninety-three coastal states have
enacted similar unilateral legislation establishing exclusive fisheries jurisdiction.
This exclusive coastal state authority, except with respect to tuna, has clearly
become customary international law. With regard to tuna, the United States
neither claims nor recognizes exclusive jurisdiction beyond twelve miles from the
coast. The United States will maintain its unwavering existing position on tuna
fisheries.
C. Marine Scientific Research
The administration strongly supports freedom of marine scientific research.
Research promotes the well-being of producing a better understanding of the
effect of the oceans on the world's climate, more effective management programs
for the world's living and nonliving resources, and more advanced pollution con-
trol measures. The LOS Convention grants discretion to coastal states to deny
scientific research in their EEZ's and on the continental shelf. Nevertheless, the
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1976)
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United States is confident it will be able to continue to conduct its marine scien-
tific research without encumbrance. Bilateral and regional arrangements are pos-
sible wherever appropriate, and other less formal approaches to facilitating marine
scienfitic research are under study.
D. Marine Environment
For the marine environment, the Convention is unnecessary. Existing interna-
tional conventions provide adequate standards restricting the discharge of pollu-
tants and regulating the design, construction, manning, and equipment of ships.
The United States may enforce international standards as a precondition of
entrance into our ports, a right recognized by international law. Present interna-
tional law also permits a coastal state to assert jurisdiction to prevent or mitigate
the threat of pollution damage caused by catastrophic accident. Therefore,
existing international law can protect our interests in controlling marine pollution.
IV. CONCLUSION
All the areas of oceans policy I have mentioned are important, and some are
indeed critical to the United States' economy and security. The oceans policy we
are developing will protect U.S. interests in each of these areas and will achieve the
important and underlying goal of promoting deep seabed mining.
Critics of the administration contend that staying outside of the LOS Conven-
tion regime will only decrease the influence and power of the United States in
global negotiations. But why has the United States enjoyed considerable influence
and power in the past? Certainly not because, in its diplomatic initiatives, it so
quickly abandoned those principles that have made it strong to begin with. Fortu-
nately, those now responsible for our foreign policy are concerned with the appli-
cation of our time-proven principles at home and abroad. The administration
firmly believes that this is the proper approach, that only with such a position can
the United States remain strong and cooperate effectively with our neighbors. As I
recall President Reagan's remarking, "So often in history great causes have been
won or lost at the last moment, because one side or the other lacked that last
reserve of character and stamina, of faith and fortitude, to see the way through to
success.
[Vol. 46: No. 2
